Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
> In message <tu7rn0$g4i3$5@dont-email.me>, at 17:19:28 on Tue, 7 Mar
> 2023, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>> Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>> On 07/03/2023 16:02, Recliner wrote:
>>>> On Tue, 7 Mar 2023 15:47:19 +0000, Graeme Wall
>>>> <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 07/03/2023 14:45, Recliner wrote:
>>>>>> On Tue, 7 Mar 2023 14:30:36 +0000, Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In message <0Ab*a4Caz@news.chiark.greenend.org.uk>, at 13:11:28 on Tue,
>>>>>>> 7 Mar 2023, Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> remarked:
>>>>>>>> Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 07 Mar 2023 11:03:23 +0000 (GMT), Theo
>>>>>>>>> <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> From this report, it sounds like the train that the 'station
>>>>>>>>>>> master' was
>>>>>>>>>>> controlling was the southbound freight, which he despatched
>>>>>>>>>>> wrong line for
>>>>>>>>>>> some reason (perhaps it had joined the main line from a branch or
>>>>>>>>>>> siding?).
>>>>>>>>>>> He was then supposed to switch it to the other (right) track, but
>>>>>>>>>>> for some
>>>>>>>>>>> unknown (to us) reason failed to do so. The northbound
>>>>>>>>>>> express passenger
>>>>>>>>>>> train was running right line throughout, probably at line speed.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That sounds backwards, because the freight was right-hand
>>>>>>>>>> running and the
>>>>>>>>>> passenger was left-hand running.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Are we sure about that?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yes. Here's a picture looking south:
>>>>>>>> https://www.kathimerini.gr/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/AP23061329469461-2
>>>>>>>> -960x600.jpg
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Geographical context, left to right at the bottom that's the new
>>>>>>>> national
>>>>>>>> road (motorway), the old national road (single carriageway), the
>>>>>>>> railway,
>>>>>>>> and a farm track.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Both trains are on the right-hand track from a north-to-south
>>>>>>>> perspective.
>>>>>>>> For the freight train that would be the usual track.
>>>>>>>> The passenger train travelling south to north is therefore left-hand
>>>>>>>> running.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And as I posted in the second message in the thread:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-europe-64807384
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The story and photos imply it was a head-on crash (with the passenger
>>>>>>> train heading north on [it's] lefthand track)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> With other confirmatory photography linked to soon after.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Have we confirmed which train the 'station master' was controlling? I
>>>>>> had originally thought it was the passenger
>>>>>> train, but the more recent report made me think it was actually
>>>>>> the freight.
>>>>>
>>>>> Logically it would be the passenger as that was the one running wrong
>>>>> line, so an active decision was taken to switch it to that.
>>>>
>>>> Yes, that's what I'd assumed earlier, but this latest report says:
>>>>
>>>> The accused, 59, who has accepted responsibility for failing to switch
>>>> tracks on a freight train — leaving it running on the same line as an
>>>> oncoming passenger train packed with university students — was
>>>> charged with
>>>> multiple counts of negligent manslaughter.
>>>
>>> Having dispatched the passenger train wrong line, he should have then
>>> switched the goods train but didn't. Either that or the report is confused.
>>
>> I'm still confused. I wonder how large an area he controlled?
>
> The news today suggests that for a brief period "all of central Greece".
>
>> Given the apparently primitive systems in use, I assumed it was quite a
>> small area, so he'd be unlikely to be in control of both of the trains
>> before the collided. So, if he was in control of the freight, he
>> wouldn't have had anything to do with the passenger express (or vice
>> versa). And we've not been given any reasons for one of the trains
>> being routed wrong-line.
>
> His finger trouble and/or lack of training, having been on the job only
> 3 days apparently.

Implying negligent or incompetent management, possibly. Whether any
inquiry will apportion blame upwards remains to be seen.

Sam

--
The entity formerly known as Sam.Wilson@ed.ac.uk
Spit the dummy to reply

Certes <Certes@example.org> wrote:
> On 07/03/2023 21:17, Roger Lynn wrote:
>> On 07/03/2023 10:26, Roland Perry wrote:
>>> In message <tu71r6$c4ds$5@dont-email.me>, at 09:57:58 on Tue, 7 Mar
>>> 2023, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>>>> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>>>> In message <tu4bho$1la5f$5@dont-email.me>, at 09:25:12 on Mon, 6 Mar
>>>>> 2023, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>>>>>> Greek train crash official charged and taken into custody
>>>>>>
>>>>>> <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/7105389a-bba7-11ed-b039-425ba6c60d6d
>>>>>> ?shareToken=e80faa5e78374044042498426a72f445>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A Greek stationmaster accused of causing the country’s deadliest train
>>>>>> accident has been charged and taken into custody, his lawyer and legal
>>>>>> officials said.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The accused, 59, who has accepted responsibility for failing to switch
>>>>>> tracks on a freight train — leaving it running on the same line as an
>>>>>> oncoming passenger train packed with university students — was
>>>>>> charged with
>>>>>> multiple counts of negligent manslaughter.
>>>>>
>>>>> Interesting; this sounds like the error was the person who routed the
>>>>> freight train, not as I think we've all been assuming the one who
>>>>> routed
>>>>> the passenger train.
>>>>>
>>>>> But that just makes things even odder, because that means *both* trains
>>>>> were supposed to running on the left, rather than the usual right. Or
>>>>> are we also assuming incorrectly that on that stretch of line "usual"
>>>>> was indeed on-the-right?
>>>>
>>>> From this report, it sounds like the train that the 'station master' was
>>>> controlling was the southbound freight, which he despatched wrong
>>>> line for
>>>> some reason (perhaps it had joined the main line from a branch or
>>>> siding?).
>>>> He was then supposed to switch it to the other (right) track, but for
>>>> some
>>>> unknown (to us) reason failed to do so. The northbound express passenger
>>>> train was running right line throughout, probably at line speed.
>>>
>>> I thought the pictures showed the passenger train running on the left,
>>> whereas in Greece one might expect the correct side normally to be the
>>> right.
>>>
>>> (It's unfortunate the word "right" has two meanings, we should be
>>> careful not to be ambiguous in its use).
>>
>> I think there are three potential meanings in this context:
>> - Right hand side verses left hand side,
>> - Right line versus wrong line (although I'm not sure that "right line" is
>>     actually correct British railway usage),
>> - Correct versus incorrect.
>>
>> In the UK the wrong line is usually on the right hand side. A SPAD or
>> faulty set of points might result in a train on an incorrect line, which
>> could be the right line on the left hand side during engineering works.
>>
>> As we are frequently reminded, trains from Ely to Norwich often
>> correctly depart on the wrong line down the up line on the right hand side.
>
> I really hope "right line" isn't used or, if it must be used, that there
> is a very clear understanding of whether it means correct or starboard.

Using “right hand” or “left hand” would be clear.

Sam

--
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Spit the dummy to reply

On 08/03/2023 08:54, Sam Wilson wrote:
> Certes <Certes@example.org> wrote:
>> On 07/03/2023 21:17, Roger Lynn wrote:
>>> On 07/03/2023 10:26, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>> In message <tu71r6$c4ds$5@dont-email.me>, at 09:57:58 on Tue, 7 Mar
>>>> 2023, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>>>>> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>>>>> In message <tu4bho$1la5f$5@dont-email.me>, at 09:25:12 on Mon, 6 Mar
>>>>>> 2023, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>>>>>>> Greek train crash official charged and taken into custody
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/7105389a-bba7-11ed-b039-425ba6c60d6d
>>>>>>> ?shareToken=e80faa5e78374044042498426a72f445>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A Greek stationmaster accused of causing the country’s deadliest train
>>>>>>> accident has been charged and taken into custody, his lawyer and legal
>>>>>>> officials said.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The accused, 59, who has accepted responsibility for failing to switch
>>>>>>> tracks on a freight train — leaving it running on the same line as an
>>>>>>> oncoming passenger train packed with university students — was
>>>>>>> charged with
>>>>>>> multiple counts of negligent manslaughter.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Interesting; this sounds like the error was the person who routed the
>>>>>> freight train, not as I think we've all been assuming the one who
>>>>>> routed
>>>>>> the passenger train.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But that just makes things even odder, because that means *both* trains
>>>>>> were supposed to running on the left, rather than the usual right. Or
>>>>>> are we also assuming incorrectly that on that stretch of line "usual"
>>>>>> was indeed on-the-right?
>>>>>
>>>>> From this report, it sounds like the train that the 'station master' was
>>>>> controlling was the southbound freight, which he despatched wrong
>>>>> line for
>>>>> some reason (perhaps it had joined the main line from a branch or
>>>>> siding?).
>>>>> He was then supposed to switch it to the other (right) track, but for
>>>>> some
>>>>> unknown (to us) reason failed to do so. The northbound express passenger
>>>>> train was running right line throughout, probably at line speed.
>>>>
>>>> I thought the pictures showed the passenger train running on the left,
>>>> whereas in Greece one might expect the correct side normally to be the
>>>> right.
>>>>
>>>> (It's unfortunate the word "right" has two meanings, we should be
>>>> careful not to be ambiguous in its use).
>>>
>>> I think there are three potential meanings in this context:
>>> - Right hand side verses left hand side,
>>> - Right line versus wrong line (although I'm not sure that "right line" is
>>>     actually correct British railway usage),
>>> - Correct versus incorrect.
>>>
>>> In the UK the wrong line is usually on the right hand side. A SPAD or
>>> faulty set of points might result in a train on an incorrect line, which
>>> could be the right line on the left hand side during engineering works.
>>>
>>> As we are frequently reminded, trains from Ely to Norwich often
>>> correctly depart on the wrong line down the up line on the right hand side.
>>
>> I really hope "right line" isn't used or, if it must be used, that there
>> is a very clear understanding of whether it means correct or starboard.
>
> Using “right hand” or “left hand” would be clear.
>

The only thing that seems to be clear is that neither knows what the
other was doing.

--
Graeme Wall
This account not read.

In message <tu9i6e$relm$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:49:18 on Wed, 8 Mar
2023, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>> The accused, 59, who has accepted responsibility for failing to switch
>>>>> tracks on a freight train — leaving it running on the same line as an
>>>>> oncoming passenger train packed with university students — was
>>>>> charged with
>>>>> multiple counts of negligent manslaughter.
>>>>
>>>> Having dispatched the passenger train wrong line, he should have then
>>>> switched the goods train but didn't. Either that or the report is confused.
>>>
>>> I'm still confused. I wonder how large an area he controlled?
>>
>> The news today suggests that for a brief period "all of central Greece".
>>
>>> Given the apparently primitive systems in use, I assumed it was quite a
>>> small area, so he'd be unlikely to be in control of both of the trains
>>> before the collided. So, if he was in control of the freight, he
>>> wouldn't have had anything to do with the passenger express (or vice
>>> versa). And we've not been given any reasons for one of the trains
>>> being routed wrong-line.
>>
>> His finger trouble and/or lack of training, having been on the job only
>> 3 days apparently.
>
>Implying negligent or incompetent management, possibly. Whether any
>inquiry will apportion blame upwards remains to be seen.

The transport minister resigned last week, and it's beginning to look
like this may bring the entire government down. Not just because of
being a train wreck, but it's exposing systemic under-investment across
many sectors.
--
Roland Perry

In message <tu9e41$qnqf$3@dont-email.me>, at 07:39:45 on Wed, 8 Mar
2023, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>On 08/03/2023 06:54, Roland Perry wrote:
>> In message <tu7tva$gdr4$2@dont-email.me>, at 17:58:02 on Tue, 7 Mar
>>2023, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>>>> The presence of the motorway overbridges would have hidden the fact
>>>>>>> that the trains were on the same track until the last moment before
>>>>>>> the collision.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Only hidden from the drivers (who would have needed a mile to brake,
>>>>>> anyway).
>>>>>
>>>>> Well, yes. If they had been able to see each other from further
>>>>>away, emergency braking might have made a great difference to the
>>>>>force of the collision.

>>>>  Even on a long, straight stretch would it be possible for eyes to
>>>> differentiate that oncoming headlights at night (as it was apparently)
>>>> were on the same track?
>>>
>>> Anna could confirm (or deny) but, assuming something like British
>>>levels of route knowledge, there'd probably be tell tale clues that
>>>would reveal the problem. From personal experience at places like
>>>Woking and Basingstoke I can pick up whether the approaching train is
>>>on the fast or slow lines at night. And that's being stood on the platform.
>> The trains were reported to be traveling at 140kph (it's not clear
>>if that's a closing speed, or just the passenger train). I wonder
>>what the combined stopping distance would be. And of course it
>>requires *both* drivers to brake to prevent a collision.
>
>I didn't claim they could have prevented the collision, just reduced
>the severity of the impact.

Any braking would have reduced the severity (modulo it happening in more
difficult terrain (eg inside a tunnel). But a 140kph passenger train
hitting a stationary freight train is still going to be very messy.
--
Roland Perry

On 08/03/2023 09:34, Roland Perry wrote:
> In message <tu9e41$qnqf$3@dont-email.me>, at 07:39:45 on Wed, 8 Mar
> 2023, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>> On 08/03/2023 06:54, Roland Perry wrote:
>>> In message <tu7tva$gdr4$2@dont-email.me>, at 17:58:02 on Tue, 7 Mar
>>> 2023, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>>>>> The presence of the motorway overbridges would have hidden the fact
>>>>>>>> that the trains were on the same track until the last moment before
>>>>>>>> the collision.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Only hidden from the drivers (who would have needed a mile to brake,
>>>>>>> anyway).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Well, yes. If they had been able to see each other from further
>>>>>> away,  emergency braking might have made a great difference to the
>>>>>> force of  the  collision.
>
>>>>>  Even on a long, straight stretch would it be possible for eyes to
>>>>> differentiate that oncoming headlights at night (as it was apparently)
>>>>> were on the same track?
>>>>
>>>> Anna could confirm (or deny) but, assuming something like British
>>>> levels of route knowledge, there'd probably be tell tale clues that
>>>> would reveal the problem. From personal experience at places like
>>>> Woking and Basingstoke I can pick up whether the approaching train
>>>> is on the fast or slow lines at night. And that's being stood on the
>>>> platform.
>>>  The trains were reported to be traveling at 140kph (it's not clear
>>> if  that's a closing speed, or just the passenger train). I wonder
>>> what the  combined stopping distance would be. And of course it
>>> requires *both*  drivers to brake to prevent a collision.
>>
>> I didn't claim they could have prevented the collision, just reduced
>> the severity of the impact.
>
> Any braking would have reduced the severity (modulo it happening in more
> difficult terrain (eg inside a tunnel). But a 140kph passenger train
> hitting a stationary freight train is still going to be very messy.

If it had braked it would have no longer been a 140kph train. I never
postulated just one train braking.

--
Graeme Wall
This account not read.

In message <tu9qv2$sl9f$5@dont-email.me>, at 11:18:58 on Wed, 8 Mar
2023, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>On 08/03/2023 09:34, Roland Perry wrote:
>> In message <tu9e41$qnqf$3@dont-email.me>, at 07:39:45 on Wed, 8 Mar
>>2023, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>> On 08/03/2023 06:54, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>> In message <tu7tva$gdr4$2@dont-email.me>, at 17:58:02 on Tue, 7 Mar
>>>>2023, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>>>>>> The presence of the motorway overbridges would have hidden the fact
>>>>>>>>> that the trains were on the same track until the last moment before
>>>>>>>>> the collision.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Only hidden from the drivers (who would have needed a mile to brake,
>>>>>>>> anyway).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Well, yes. If they had been able to see each other from further
>>>>>>>away,  emergency braking might have made a great difference to
>>>>>>>the force of  the  collision.
>>
>>>>>>  Even on a long, straight stretch would it be possible for eyes
>>>>>> differentiate that oncoming headlights at night (as it was
>>>>>>apparently) were on the same track?
>>>>>
>>>>> Anna could confirm (or deny) but, assuming something like British
>>>>>levels of route knowledge, there'd probably be tell tale clues that
>>>>>would reveal the problem. From personal experience at places like
>>>>>Woking and Basingstoke I can pick up whether the approaching train
>>>>>is on the fast or slow lines at night. And that's being stood on the platform.

>>>>  The trains were reported to be traveling at 140kph (it's not clear
>>>>if  that's a closing speed, or just the passenger train). I wonder
>>>>what the  combined stopping distance would be. And of course it
>>>>requires *both*  drivers to brake to prevent a collision.
>>>
>>> I didn't claim they could have prevented the collision, just reduced
>>>the severity of the impact.

>> Any braking would have reduced the severity (modulo it happening in
>>more difficult terrain (eg inside a tunnel). But a 140kph passenger
>>train hitting a stationary freight train is still going to be very messy.
>
>If it had braked it would have no longer been a 140kph train. I never
>postulated just one train braking.

Nor did I that deny there might be a reduction in the force of the
collision (although the aftermath could have been worse in a less
favorable location).
--
Roland Perry

On Wed, 8 Mar 2023 12:38:50 +0000, Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:

>
>Nor did I that deny there might be a reduction in the force of the
>collision (although the aftermath could have been worse in a less
>favorable location).

Are you still interested in being notified of your gradual switch to US spelling?

"Recliner" <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:tu8amg$iknb$5@dont-email.me...
>> During the day it's a lot easier because you can see the car/train in
>> relation to road verges/white lines (road), or signalling/electrification
>> masts and perhaps the tracks themselves (railway), even at a fair
>> distance.
>
> I'd have thought it would be easier at night on rail tracks, as you would
> see the headlights of the opposing train reflected on the rails. But that
> would only work on dead straight tracks.

And it would assume that, from a distance, each driver could tell that the
headlights were reflecting off the *same* rails that his train was on,
rather than the rails of the opposite track, when there is a large area of
darkness between the rails that are illuminated by the drivers' own train
and the distant rails that are illuminated by the oncoming train.

To be effective, each driver would have to recognise from a long way off
that the oncoming train was on his track and then make an emergency brake
application which in itself could cause injuries for which he might be held
liable if it was later discovered to have been unnecessary because it was a
false alarm. And we don't know how far away each driver could see the
other's train, due to curvature of track, cuttings, bridges, gradients etc.
Having said that, *any* braking would have helped. And I'm sure both drivers
braked as hard as possible once they recognised that they were going to
crash head-on.

What are the rules (in the UK and other countries) if a driver recognises
that a crash is inevitable. Having set the brake lever to the emergency
position, there is nothing more that he can do. Unlike the driver of a road
vehicle, had cannot steer around a hazard just before he reaches it. Is he
allowed/encouraged to leave the driving position and exit through the train,
warning passengers to brace themselves and maybe to follow him as fast as
possible? I remember at the time of Grayrigg, Richard Branson praising the
driver who remained at the controls right until the end, but should the
driver have done that, honourable thought it is, if there was time to save
himself and to warn passengers?

Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
> In message <tu9i6e$relm$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:49:18 on Wed, 8 Mar
> 2023, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>>> The accused, 59, who has accepted responsibility for failing to switch
>>>>>> tracks on a freight train — leaving it running on the same line as an
>>>>>> oncoming passenger train packed with university students — was
>>>>>> charged with
>>>>>> multiple counts of negligent manslaughter.
>>>>>
>>>>> Having dispatched the passenger train wrong line, he should have then
>>>>> switched the goods train but didn't. Either that or the report is confused.
>>>>
>>>> I'm still confused. I wonder how large an area he controlled?
>>>
>>> The news today suggests that for a brief period "all of central Greece".
>>>
>>>> Given the apparently primitive systems in use, I assumed it was quite a
>>>> small area, so he'd be unlikely to be in control of both of the trains
>>>> before the collided. So, if he was in control of the freight, he
>>>> wouldn't have had anything to do with the passenger express (or vice
>>>> versa). And we've not been given any reasons for one of the trains
>>>> being routed wrong-line.
>>>
>>> His finger trouble and/or lack of training, having been on the job only
>>> 3 days apparently.
>>
>> Implying negligent or incompetent management, possibly. Whether any
>> inquiry will apportion blame upwards remains to be seen.
>
> The transport minister resigned last week, and it's beginning to look
> like this may bring the entire government down. Not just because of
> being a train wreck, but it's exposing systemic under-investment across
> many sectors.

Indeed, though that’s not the same thing as being found guilty of corporate
manslaughter, or whatever the relevant offence would be.

Sam

--
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Spit the dummy to reply

Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> On 08/03/2023 08:54, Sam Wilson wrote:
>> Certes <Certes@example.org> wrote:
>>> On 07/03/2023 21:17, Roger Lynn wrote:
>>>> On 07/03/2023 10:26, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>> In message <tu71r6$c4ds$5@dont-email.me>, at 09:57:58 on Tue, 7 Mar
>>>>> 2023, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>>>>>> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>> In message <tu4bho$1la5f$5@dont-email.me>, at 09:25:12 on Mon, 6 Mar
>>>>>>> 2023, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>>>>>>>> Greek train crash official charged and taken into custody
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/7105389a-bba7-11ed-b039-425ba6c60d6d
>>>>>>>> ?shareToken=e80faa5e78374044042498426a72f445>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A Greek stationmaster accused of causing the country’s deadliest train
>>>>>>>> accident has been charged and taken into custody, his lawyer and legal
>>>>>>>> officials said.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The accused, 59, who has accepted responsibility for failing to switch
>>>>>>>> tracks on a freight train — leaving it running on the same line as an
>>>>>>>> oncoming passenger train packed with university students — was
>>>>>>>> charged with
>>>>>>>> multiple counts of negligent manslaughter.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Interesting; this sounds like the error was the person who routed the
>>>>>>> freight train, not as I think we've all been assuming the one who
>>>>>>> routed
>>>>>>> the passenger train.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But that just makes things even odder, because that means *both* trains
>>>>>>> were supposed to running on the left, rather than the usual right. Or
>>>>>>> are we also assuming incorrectly that on that stretch of line "usual"
>>>>>>> was indeed on-the-right?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From this report, it sounds like the train that the 'station master' was
>>>>>> controlling was the southbound freight, which he despatched wrong
>>>>>> line for
>>>>>> some reason (perhaps it had joined the main line from a branch or
>>>>>> siding?).
>>>>>> He was then supposed to switch it to the other (right) track, but for
>>>>>> some
>>>>>> unknown (to us) reason failed to do so. The northbound express passenger
>>>>>> train was running right line throughout, probably at line speed.
>>>>>
>>>>> I thought the pictures showed the passenger train running on the left,
>>>>> whereas in Greece one might expect the correct side normally to be the
>>>>> right.
>>>>>
>>>>> (It's unfortunate the word "right" has two meanings, we should be
>>>>> careful not to be ambiguous in its use).
>>>>
>>>> I think there are three potential meanings in this context:
>>>> - Right hand side verses left hand side,
>>>> - Right line versus wrong line (although I'm not sure that "right line" is
>>>>     actually correct British railway usage),
>>>> - Correct versus incorrect.
>>>>
>>>> In the UK the wrong line is usually on the right hand side. A SPAD or
>>>> faulty set of points might result in a train on an incorrect line, which
>>>> could be the right line on the left hand side during engineering works.
>>>>
>>>> As we are frequently reminded, trains from Ely to Norwich often
>>>> correctly depart on the wrong line down the up line on the right hand side.
>>>
>>> I really hope "right line" isn't used or, if it must be used, that there
>>> is a very clear understanding of whether it means correct or starboard.
>>
>> Using “right hand” or “left hand” would be clear.
>>
>
> The only thing that seems to be clear is that neither knows what the
> other was doing.

If this wasn’t such a sombre topic that would be very funny.

Sam

--
The entity formerly known as Sam.Wilson@ed.ac.uk
Spit the dummy to reply

In message <tua5fm$ug1s$2@dont-email.me>, at 14:18:30 on Wed, 8 Mar
2023, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>> In message <tu9i6e$relm$1@dont-email.me>, at 08:49:18 on Wed, 8 Mar
>> 2023, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>>>> The accused, 59, who has accepted responsibility for failing to switch
>>>>>>> tracks on a freight train — leaving it running on the same line as an
>>>>>>> oncoming passenger train packed with university students — was
>>>>>>> charged with
>>>>>>> multiple counts of negligent manslaughter.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Having dispatched the passenger train wrong line, he should have then
>>>>>> switched the goods train but didn't. Either that or the report is
>>>>>>confused.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm still confused. I wonder how large an area he controlled?
>>>>
>>>> The news today suggests that for a brief period "all of central Greece".
>>>>
>>>>> Given the apparently primitive systems in use, I assumed it was quite a
>>>>> small area, so he'd be unlikely to be in control of both of the trains
>>>>> before the collided. So, if he was in control of the freight, he
>>>>> wouldn't have had anything to do with the passenger express (or vice
>>>>> versa). And we've not been given any reasons for one of the trains
>>>>> being routed wrong-line.
>>>>
>>>> His finger trouble and/or lack of training, having been on the job only
>>>> 3 days apparently.
>>>
>>> Implying negligent or incompetent management, possibly. Whether any
>>> inquiry will apportion blame upwards remains to be seen.
>>
>> The transport minister resigned last week, and it's beginning to look
>> like this may bring the entire government down. Not just because of
>> being a train wreck, but it's exposing systemic under-investment across
>> many sectors.
>
>Indeed, though that’s not the same thing as being found guilty of corporate
>manslaughter, or whatever the relevant offence would be.

Corporate manslaughter is a very difficult thin to prove. Back in the
day I had dinner (in Brussels, where we were both there on different
business) with the Home Office lawyer who had looked into this after the
Herald of Free Enterprise disaster.
--
Roland Perry

Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
> The transport minister resigned last week, and it's beginning to look
> like this may bring the entire government down. Not just because of
> being a train wreck, but it's exposing systemic under-investment across
> many sectors.

Systematic *over* investment, aka corruption and mismanagement:

SOCIETY
TEMPI, THE ANATOMY OF A TRAGEDY

The ghosts of OSE

Why Greece never managed to acquire a modern railway, even though it
"invested" tens of billions - Mismanagement and corruption in the
organization that has cost as much as 5 "Olympics" - From the "shack" of the
junta, to the optical fibers that never worked.

ACHILLES HEKIMOGLOU*
06.03.2023 • 12:33
https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/562306105/ta-fantasmata-toy-ose/

Few fields in Greece reflect the state of the Greek state as much as the
railways . In the 19th century they constituted the first step in the
modernization of Greece, acting not only as a catalyst for its participation
in the 1st industrial revolution, but also as a "key" for its entry into the
international capital markets, from which it had been excluded until then.

The railways were, in fact, the biggest investment in the history of Greece
until then and the decision to build them was largely the result of the
geopolitical expectations generated by the prospect of the opening of the
Suez Canal and the possibility of obtaining a share of the expected freight
traffic of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The railways consistently served all of the Nation's major military
expeditions in the Balkans and Asia Minor, while absorbing the Greek leg of
the Ottoman railway concessions, which brought only deficits and problematic
and time-consuming alignments, which still survive in the Northern Greek
network.

They are also credited with the transfer of an entire army to the Albanian
Front, which constitutes the greatest epic since their establishment in
Greece. And they were completely destroyed by the German invaders, who
never compensated the country for it. In fact, it took decades of hard work
in the post-war reconstruction, within the Marshall Plan and the (weak)
Public Investment Program, for the then Hellenic State Railways (SEK) to
approach the situation they were in during the 4th of August regime.

The "shack" of the junta

But it was a different era: The corporatist and unionized post-war state had
generously ceded the privileges of freight transport and land passenger
transport to the closed professions of truck and bus drivers, respectively.
At the same time, it promoted the car and road transport as a priority, thus
depriving it of income that the rest of the European railways had de facto.
The seed of a second-speed means of transport had already been well planted
during the time of the EPE government.

The regime of April 21 left a lasting negative imprint on the railways due
to an otherwise unexpected cause: King Constantine's comic counter-movement
took advantage of SEK, which was the only operator at the time to have its
own telecommunications network. In retaliation, as happened to the whole of
the public administration and the armed forces, at the end of 1967 the junta
"disposed" en masse executives who were considered loyal to the Crown and
gave positions of responsibility to persons closely connected to the
leadership of the Aprilians, "hating" at the same time and trade unions with
people they like.

Then "shacks" were created in the OSE that began to plague the organization
and proved to be very resistant over time. It is indicative of the
corrosion caused by the "droplets" of the railway that up until the second
decade of the 21st century, a relative of a well-known arch-torturer of the
junta continued to be a perennial sponsor of studies. After all, during the
dictatorship period, the SEKs were renamed to OSEs. The procurement cycle

This was followed by repeated attempts to consolidate and modernize the OSE
by the democratic governments. But these were neither decisive nor did they
move faster than the agency's ballooning deficits and technological decline.

In the 1980s, the first signaling contracts of the rail network began,
promising faster and better travel, but also savings in human resources due
to the automation brought about by technology. Within three decades, a
multitude of contracts were executed, which would have cost the Greek state
almost half a billion euros (in 2009 prices), with contractors from major
foreign suppliers and in several cases with an invisible mediator, a
well-known owner of an important business group in the country, who he had
privileged interlocutors in the services of the OSE – some of them who were
recruited by the April regime.

And despite the installation of modern signaling systems, which together
promised to bring the remote control of trains (that is, the remote and safe
control of traffic with the employment of infinitely smaller staff, as was
already the case in Western Europe), these quickly ceased to function. They
were decimated by lack of maintenance and looting of their equipment. Scrap
gangs aside, at least two past OSE administrations had been privy to an
undeclared Luddism by a few hardliners who saw the installation of
technologies as an existential threat to their professional futures.

Thus a completely "Greek" situation was created, where the technology has
been imported and paid for, without working, thus requiring the maintenance
of significant human resources for specialties that come from the 19th
century and have become a thing of the past in the developed railways of the
West. This failure is not unrelated to the subsequent adventures of the
organization, nor of course to the recent tragic accident. The "five
Olympics"

Although in the minds of many the OSE crisis is directly linked to the
troika and the debt crisis, the reality is that it dates back to the 1990s,
when some completely wrong decisions were made that had a terrible impact on
the evolution of the railways. At a time when all of Europe was planning
ultra-high speed networks from scratch, Greece took the fateful decision to
modernize the then existing network, for which huge sums were spent, without
ever bringing either modern services or serious revenue to the railway.

Another problem was substandard corporate governance, which had an impact on
the financial health of the then single OSE. In the mid-1990s, the
government of Costas Simitis canceled the Organization's debts, aspiring to
make a new beginning. Fifteen years later, reality completely defied
expectations, as his debts exceeded 10 billion euros, exacerbating Greece's
debt crisis.

A third imprudence on the part of Athens was that it began to provide lavish
state aid, but without maintaining elementary precautions of accounting
separation, which was then necessary in view of the liberalization of the
market in Europe. This was something that the country would later find
before it in the bras de fer with the Trojans.

In this way, OSE ended up burdening itself and the state (since the
borrowing it resorted to was accompanied by the State's guarantee), with the
result that it had a financial footprint that was close to five times the
debts of the state-owned Olympic Aviation.

ERGOSE and new contracts

In the 1990s, the Commission vetoed the granting of Community funding, as it
was revealed that the OSE was following the "sinful" system of defaults,
which resulted in direct project assignments, without tenders and with the
main characteristic of overcharging. Thus he set an ultimatum to Athens to
transfer all the new works to a company "pure" of sins - the then newly
created ERGOSE.

This new beginning would not be easy. OSE made a foolish choice, which set
the railway back 30 years, by choosing to lay the new high-speed line
through Mount Kallidromo, which was geologically completely unsuitable.
This was followed by the signing of a construction contract with a
consortium in which a publisher of the time participated, who secured the
project thanks to the borrowed experience of foreign houses and at an
unrealistic discount.

It was only a matter of time before the contract was interrupted and the
project dragged on for almost a decade. Observant travelers will remember
another bridge on the Athens-Lamia highway that had been erected, without
being completed, and was lost for many years in the direction of nowhere.
Ultimately the haunted contract was "saved" by the domestic construction
system. It took the tenure of eleven ministers, six managing councilors and
the execution of main and supplementary construction contracts over 16
years, spanning three program periods, to complete the project.

At the same time, German interests conspired to displace traditional OSE
suppliers and succeeded either directly or through consultants, such as
Deutsche Bahn and Lahmayer (who would later be convicted by the German
Judiciary of foreign bribery), in securing major projects, such as GSM-R,
Suburban, but also studies.

At the same time, however, ERGOSE quickly fell into the sins of OSE. In
April 2002, he announced the studies of the new Lianokladi - Domokos
high-speed line. A year later, he assigned for the intermediate section –
the most pivotal part of the project – the preliminary study, a series of
studies, the drafting of the tender documents, etc. in partnership with
design offices. Two months later the tender was canceled due to objections.

In message <qm3h0ipcplb7pt5h8jqpkudmt6oakmsc4p@4ax.com>, at 13:35:09 on
Wed, 8 Mar 2023, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>On Wed, 8 Mar 2023 12:38:50 +0000, Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>
>>Nor did I that deny there might be a reduction in the force of the
>>collision (although the aftermath could have been worse in a less
>>favorable location).
>
>Are you still interested in being notified of your gradual switch to US
>spelling?

No.

Like I said last time you tried to start one of your pointless arguments
about this, there's so many postings to reply to (you being one of the
worst offenders) I don't time to correct my spell-checker back to
UK-English as thoroughly.

But if course, you knew what I meant, even if seeing US spelling.
--
Roland Perry

In message <tua501$udvg$1@dont-email.me>, at 14:10:11 on Wed, 8 Mar
2023, NY <me@privacy.invalid> remarked:
>"Recliner" <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote in message
>news:tu8amg$iknb$5@dont-email.me...
>>> During the day it's a lot easier because you can see the car/train in
>>> relation to road verges/white lines (road), or signalling/electrification
>>> masts and perhaps the tracks themselves (railway), even at a fair
>>>distance.
>>
>> I'd have thought it would be easier at night on rail tracks, as you would
>> see the headlights of the opposing train reflected on the rails. But that
>> would only work on dead straight tracks.
>
>And it would assume that, from a distance, each driver could tell that
>the headlights were reflecting off the *same* rails that his train was
>on, rather than the rails of the opposite track, when there is a large
>area of darkness between the rails that are illuminated by the drivers'
>own train and the distant rails that are illuminated by the oncoming train.
>
>To be effective, each driver would have to recognise from a long way
>off that the oncoming train was on his track and then make an emergency
>brake application which in itself could cause injuries for which he
>might be held liable if it was later discovered to have been
>unnecessary because it was a false alarm. And we don't know how far
>away each driver could see the other's train, due to curvature of
>track, cuttings, bridges, gradients etc.

The passenger train was emerging from a tunnel on a bend, so I think we
do have some kind of idea.

>Having said that, *any* braking would have helped. And I'm sure both
>drivers braked as hard as possible once they recognised that they were
>going to crash head-on.
>
>What are the rules (in the UK and other countries) if a driver
>recognises that a crash is inevitable. Having set the brake lever to
>the emergency position, there is nothing more that he can do. Unlike
>the driver of a road vehicle, had cannot steer around a hazard just
>before he reaches it. Is he allowed/encouraged to leave the driving
>position and exit through the train, warning passengers to brace
>themselves and maybe to follow him as fast as possible?

There wouldn't be time for any of that. Sometimes drivers evacuate
themselves into perhaps the rear of a locomotive.

>I remember at the time of Grayrigg, Richard Branson praising the driver
>who remained at the controls right until the end, but should the driver
>have done that, honourable thought it is, if there was time to save
>himself and to warn passengers?

That was a derailment closely following dodgy points, so very different
circumstances.

The thing about Branson was he implied the driver had doggedly gripped
the steering wheel to try to keep the train on a less perilous
trajectory, when we know there are some rather big holes in that theory.
--
Roland Perry

Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote:
> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
> > The transport minister resigned last week, and it's beginning to look
> > like this may bring the entire government down. Not just because of
> > being a train wreck, but it's exposing systemic under-investment across
> > many sectors.
>
> Systematic *over* investment, aka corruption and mismanagement:

Hellenic railway: 17 years, 160 million, zero safety

The delay of a project made the Greek railways "blind".

George Lialias
08.03.2023 • 12:44
https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/562311406/ellinikos-sidirodromos-17-chronia-160-ekat-asfaleia-miden/

More than 160 million euros have been spent from 2006 to date to operate
modern signaling - remote control, train safety and radio communication
systems , with nothing still working. Three of the projects have been
delivered, while one continues to receive extensions (seven so far and
counting). We unravel the "crazy course" of delays and omissions that after
so many years has us stuck at ground zero in relation to train safety.

In recent decades, the European Union has been promoting the creation of a
single safety system, ERTMS (European Railways Traffic Management System) .
This consists of two subsystems: the train control system (European Traffic
Control System, ETCS) and the radio coverage system (GSM-R) . But for ETCS
to work, there must be a functioning signaling and remote control system.
This system operated on most of the core network and was built under various
contracts (the Ministry of Infrastructure says there are 15).

No maintenance

However, the contracts related to its construction and not its maintenance.
Thus, when the first problems began in the late 2000s, which were
exacerbated by the financial crisis, the system began to collapse. In 2014,
ERGOSE commissioned (to the joint venture TOMI – Alstom) the restructuring,
i.e. the repair of the existing network (Athens – Thessaloniki –
Promachona), with the aim of completing it by 2016.

This contract is still not completed today, with its budget having increased
from 41 million euros to 51.2 million euros. And this is because from 2016
the project began to receive extensions: 4 days for SYRIZA and 3 days for
New Democracy (it is going to get one more, until September this year). As
it turns out, the two companies had divided the project (between them), with
TOMI taking over the section up to Platy (where Bombardier company systems
used to exist) and Alstom from Platy to Promachona (where its own systems
used to exist). However, along the way the two companies clashed, with the
result that Alstom did not certify the studies and work of the TOMIS
department and the project showed little progress. ERGOSE, instead of
declaring the consortium bankrupt, started giving extensions until, around
2017, the project "bogged down" completely. The European Union and the
Financial Control Committee intervened in the case, which demanded 2.4
million euros from ERGOSE.

Hardware replacement

And while ERGOSE rejected any discussion about replacing existing equipment,
finally in 2021 (after two years of inactivity) it decided to sign a
supplementary contract of 13.3 million euros with the consortium, which also
included the replacement of equipment in the Oinoi - Tithorea section ,
which the State had already paid to be repaired. At the same time, with an
internal agreement between TOMIS and Alstom, the former granted its
construction object to the latter, remaining in the joint venture scheme.
At the end of the same year, Alstom handed over the remote control system to
the section it had taken over alone (from Platy to Promachona). In May
2022, the remote control was also delivered to the Tithorea - Domokos
section, which was built under a different contract from Siemens. As for
the main project, according to the Ministry of Infrastructure, it is
currently at 69% and will be delivered by September this year.

Jobs pending

Long before ERGOSE was awarded the contract for the withdrawal of the
signaling system, in 2007 the company commissioned the installation of the
ETCS system on the main railway line, at a cost of 17.2 million euros.
According to ERGOSE, the project was delivered in 2020. At the same time,
with a second contract, worth 21.3 million euros, the ETCS system was
installed on the trains in 2007-2015. However, ETCS requires the operation
of the signaling and remote control system. Thus the system remains
inactive and it is unknown if it is somehow maintained.

Finally, OSE allocated 56.8 million euros for the installation of a GMS-R
radio coverage system on the axis Kiato - Athens - Thessaloniki - Promachona
(and some branches). The project started in 2006 and was completed in 2017.
However, it has not been clarified whether the system is operational, as
until the autumn of 2022 OSE and Hellenic Train disagreed on the date for
the start of tests. Meanwhile, in 2019 ERGOSE signed a €7m contract with
another company to maintain the system, which is apparently inactive.

"There are responsibilities to the contractors"

ERGOSE should have declared the TOMIS-Alstom joint venture bankrupt, when
the problems started in the signaling - remote control project. This was
supported yesterday by Michalis Dachtylides, president of the Panhellenic
Association of Engineering Contractors of Public Works (PEDMEDE). "Of
course, there are responsibilities to the contractors. For them not to be
able to certify a single study for years means that the studies were of low
quality. But why didn't ERGOSE declare them exempt? When the project does
not go well, you have to stop it and continue with a new contractor. I
assume that ERGOSE did not do it in order not to start the process from the
beginning, with measurements of the project that had been built until then,
legal disputes and so on. There were probably other factors – for example,
at that time there was no other company except Alstom in these projects and
ERGOSE was forced to "swallow" the difficulties. Possibly there were also
inside games, which we will never know. In these cases various
intermediaries appear, each trying to promote their own system and depending
on the political support they have, they succeed or not."

On 08/03/2023 14:10, NY wrote:
> "Recliner" <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote in message
> news:tu8amg$iknb$5@dont-email.me...
>>> During the day it's a lot easier because you can see the car/train in
>>> relation to road verges/white lines (road), or
>>> signalling/electrification
>>> masts and perhaps the tracks themselves (railway), even at a fair
>>> distance.
>>
>> I'd have thought it would be easier at night on rail tracks, as you would
>> see the headlights of the opposing train reflected on the rails. But that
>> would only work on dead straight tracks.
>
> And it would assume that, from a distance, each driver could tell that
> the headlights were reflecting off the *same* rails that his train was
> on, rather than the rails of the opposite track, when there is a large
> area of darkness between the rails that are illuminated by the drivers'
> own train and the distant rails that are illuminated by the oncoming train.
>
> To be effective, each driver would have to recognise from a long way off
> that the oncoming train was on his track and then make an emergency
> brake application which in itself could cause injuries for which he
> might be held liable if it was later discovered to have been unnecessary
> because it was a false alarm. And we don't know how far away each driver
> could see the other's train, due to curvature of track, cuttings,
> bridges, gradients etc. Having said that, *any* braking would have
> helped. And I'm sure both drivers braked as hard as possible once they
> recognised that they were going to crash head-on.
>
> What are the rules (in the UK and other countries) if a driver
> recognises that a crash is inevitable. Having set the brake lever to the
> emergency position, there is nothing more that he can do. Unlike the
> driver of a road vehicle, had cannot steer around a hazard just before
> he reaches it. Is he allowed/encouraged to leave the driving position
> and exit through the train, warning passengers to brace themselves and
> maybe to follow him as fast as possible?

Can't do that with a locomotive, best he could do is head for the back
cab and brace himself against the bulkhead. Judging by the damage to
both locos that probably wouldn't have helped.

I remember at the time of
> Grayrigg, Richard Branson praising the driver who remained at the
> controls right until the end, but should the driver have done that,
> honourable thought it is, if there was time to save himself and to warn
> passengers?

The point in that case, though rather distorted by both Branson and the
press, was that the driver, though badly injured, was using his phone to
try and summon help.

--
Graeme Wall
This account not read.

Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
> In message <3Ab*+zCaz@news.chiark.greenend.org.uk>, at 11:03:23 on Tue,
> 7 Mar 2023, Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> remarked:
> >Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> From this report, it sounds like the train that the 'station master'
> >> was controlling was the southbound freight, which he despatched wrong
> >> line for some reason (perhaps it had joined the main line from a branch
> >> or siding?).
> >> He was then supposed to switch it to the other (right) track, but for
> >> some unknown (to us) reason failed to do so. The northbound express
> >> passenger train was running right line throughout, probably at line
> >> speed.
> >
> >That sounds backwards, because the freight was right-hand running and the
> >passenger was left-hand running. Since the usual rule is right-hand
> >running, the passenger was running 'wrong line' and the freight was
> >running 'normally'.
>
> If this was AOL, I'd say "+1" (but it isn't, so I won't).

"The train entered the wrong track without any reaction from the train side
either."

POLICY

Gerapetritis for trains: Two stationmasters everywhere – Aim to restart by
the end of the month

The steps and measures for the restart of the railway "only under conditions
of absolute safety" were highlighted by the Minister of Transport, in the
press conference he gave in the wake of the tragedy in Tempi

Newsroom
08.03.2023 • 13:14
https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/562312159/gerapetritis-gia-trena-dyo-stathmarches-pantoy-stochos-i-epanekkinisi-eos-to-telos-toy-mina/

The steps and measures for the restart of the railway "only under conditions
of absolute security" were highlighted by the Minister of State, also
responsible for Infrastructure and Transport issues Giorgos Gerapetritis ,
in the press conference he gave in the wake of the tragedy in Tempi . Mr.
Gerapetritis stated that the presence of two station masters at each station
will be mandatory, while he pointed out that there will be a reduction in
transport work.

"It is our desire that the railway restart as soon as possible. "Possibly
until the end of the month" he noted when asked about this, while describing
the context of reducing the transport project, he spoke of a reduction of
trains - routes or even a reduction of stations where the train will stop.
He spoke of a complex framework, underlining that it will not be implemented
if the additional level of security has not been ensured, with parallel
consultation with all agencies.

Asked by "K" with which routes the railway will start, he replied that "the
plan has not yet been completed, as discussions with the workers and
Hellenic Train will follow. We will have an increase in staff presence and
probably a decrease in project. This will be done symmetrically. We don't
want to deforest the lines that are functional and necessary."

Regarding the accident in Tempe, he emphasized that it is an unprecedented
national tragedy that marked us all and noted that "this suffering should
find a catharsis". He also apologized to the government for not being able
to prevent the accident.

"Three levels of security were not met"

As he said, three levels of security were not met in Tempe:

"The local remote control center in Larissa was fully operational and
uninterrupted, there was no outage at the local center. In the evening,
there should have been automatic marking on the route board, but that did
not happen," noted the minister.

A second level was the manual change of the key, which did not happen,
added Mr Gerapetritis.

“A third level, there had to be monitoring on the electronic control
panel, after the train left Larissa, and for a distance of 5 km after it
left. If the monitoring had been done on the board after departure, the
fatality would have been avoided", continued the minister.

"With a full, universal remote control system in the country, the tragedy would have been avoided"

Mr. Gerapetritis noted that the train entered the wrong line without any
reaction from the train side. "I'm not saying this to highlight human
error. There were lapses in human management, but if we had a complete,
universal remote control system in the country, the tragedy would have been
avoided," he emphasized.

He also said that there will be a support framework for the victims'
families that will be announced soon and that will include all issues and
not just compensation.

"More and more specialized staff is needed"

The Minister of State underlined that it is obvious that more and more
skilled personnel are needed in the railway. As he pointed out, in the last
15 years, there has been a significant reduction due to the memorandums and
a massive wave of retirements. At this point he referred to the efforts to
strengthen the staff, saying that an effort has been made with the present
government 1) through mobility, 2) through about 200 recruitments with
service cards, 3) through routing 217 permanent recruitments with two
competitions in 2021 and 2022.

Answering a question from moneyreview.gr, the minister noted that there is a
significant reduction in staff. A big problem has arisen in the last three
years with massive departures due to retirements, he noted. As he said,
there were quick moves with about 200 people coming in with a service card.
Once the scheme is completed, an additional 217 people will come.

According to the minister, 35 positions had been announced under SYRIZA and
24 people had been hired. There will be a new organizational chart, the
minister said, while a new business plan is already being prepared that has
to do with the staff organizational chart, among other things. As he added,
there will also be support at the level of education and training. With a
new system, new technological skills will be needed from the workers, he
pointed out.

Contact Mitsotakis with Alstom of France

Regarding the universal upgrade of electronic infrastructure (signaling
across the entire spectrum of the network and universal remote control
operation), he said that a contract was signed for the first time in 2014.
This contract, as the minister mentioned, was partially developed until 2017
(approx. at a rate of 32%). However, as he pointed out, the deliverable
had bugs and only 18% was actually functional, with the rest having to be
rebuilt. The minister added that in 2017 the implementation of the contract
was stopped because serious errors occurred.

He also emphasized that from 2019 an attempt was made to withdraw the
contract and a supplementary contract was signed in 2021. As he emphasized,
today 70% of the contract has been delivered and the estimate is that within
the year the delivery of the remaining percentage will also take place.

At this point, he underlined that Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis
contacted the CEO of the parent company Alstom France and gave a clear order
to speed up all procedures. Announcements about the completion times are
expected in the next period.

New framework for sabotage

The Minister of State also announced that the personnel training framework
will be re-evaluated, as well as that a provision will be filed that will
provide for a stricter framework in terms of sabotage, theft and destruction
in the network.

He also added that today in Greece there is an echelon of the European
office for railways, while there was communication between the prime
minister and the German chancellor Olaf Scholz. As he added, there will be
cooperation with the dispatch of an echelon from Germany for further
investigation and submission of security proposals.

He further stated that the establishment of the national air and rail
accident investigation agency will be initiated.

Why is Greece being referred to the European Court of Justice and which
contracts are being reviewed?

To a question from moneyreview.gr, Mr. Gerapetritis replied that there are
a series of contracts concerning the upgrading of infrastructure and network
and the internal relations that develop between the parties involved
(between OSE, ERGOSE and Hellenic Train). He referred to the contract of
the Greek State with the Organization that is in the Court of Auditors and
the issue of the contract for the barren lines. Some have been signed and
others are underway, he said.

When asked by "K" if Hellenic Train will raise issues of compensation from
the State, he stated that the State understands that there will be no
question of compensation and added that the State is in consultation with
Hellenic Train.

The following are points of Mr. Gerapetritis' statement:

An unprecedented national tragedy that marked us all.
This suffering should find a catharsis.
I am not here for partisan confrontation and offsets.
The current government's responsibility has been taken.

Apologies on behalf of the government for not being able to prevent this
incredible accident.

On 2023-03-08 15:04:35, Graeme Wall wrote:
>
> I remember at the time of
>> Grayrigg, Richard Branson praising the driver who remained at the
>> controls right until the end, but should the driver have done that,
>> honourable thought it is, if there was time to save himself and to warn
>> passengers?
>
> The point in that case, though rather distorted by both Branson and the
> press, was that the driver, though badly injured, was using his phone to
> try and summon help.

I thought he was busy steering:

"Our driver could have run from his seat and dashed to the next carriage,
where he might well have been safe,' said Sir Richard. "Instead, he tried
to steer the train to safety."

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-438286/Train-crash-It-sabotage.html

--
Graham Nye
news(a)thenyes.org.uk

On Wed, 8 Mar 2023 16:21:13 +0000
Graham Nye <nospam@thenyes.org.uk> wrote:
>On 2023-03-08 15:04:35, Graeme Wall wrote:
>>
>> I remember at the time of
>>> Grayrigg, Richard Branson praising the driver who remained at the
>>> controls right until the end, but should the driver have done that,
>>> honourable thought it is, if there was time to save himself and to warn
>>> passengers?
>>
>> The point in that case, though rather distorted by both Branson and the
>> press, was that the driver, though badly injured, was using his phone to
>> try and summon help.
>
>I thought he was busy steering:
>
>"Our driver could have run from his seat and dashed to the next carriage,
>where he might well have been safe,' said Sir Richard. "Instead, he tried
>to steer the train to safety."

Makes you wonder how he thinks his rocket planes work. Someone lights the
touchpaper?

Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
> In message <qm3h0ipcplb7pt5h8jqpkudmt6oakmsc4p@4ax.com>, at 13:35:09 on
> Wed, 8 Mar 2023, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>> On Wed, 8 Mar 2023 12:38:50 +0000, Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>
>>> Nor did I that deny there might be a reduction in the force of the
>>> collision (although the aftermath could have been worse in a less
>>> favorable location).
>>
>> Are you still interested in being notified of your gradual switch to US
>> spelling?
>
> No.
>
> Like I said last time you tried to start one of your pointless arguments
> about this, there's so many postings to reply to (you being one of the
> worst offenders) I don't time to correct my spell-checker back to
> UK-English as thoroughly.
>
> But if course, you knew what I meant, even if seeing US spelling.

Of course I knew what you meant. But you had denied that your posts
(whoever types them) increasingly used US spelling, and asked me to prove
it. Now I have, you say you didn't want to know.

And we know you use an ancient, long-unsupported, locally-written news
reader. Surely it came with a UK spell checker, if it has one at all?

On 2023-03-08 16:29:22, Muttley@dastardlyhq.com wrote:
> On Wed, 8 Mar 2023 16:21:13 +0000
> Graham Nye <nospam@thenyes.org.uk> wrote:
>>
>> "Our driver could have run from his seat and dashed to the next carriage,
>> where he might well have been safe,' said Sir Richard. "Instead, he tried
>> to steer the train to safety."
>
> Makes you wonder how he thinks his rocket planes work.

His last one didn't:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cornwall-64253375

--
Graham Nye
news(a)thenyes.org.uk

Muttley@dastardlyhq.com wrote:
> On Wed, 8 Mar 2023 16:21:13 +0000
> Graham Nye <nospam@thenyes.org.uk> wrote:
> >On 2023-03-08 15:04:35, Graeme Wall wrote:
> >I thought he was busy steering:
> >
> >"Our driver could have run from his seat and dashed to the next carriage,
> >where he might well have been safe,' said Sir Richard. "Instead, he tried
> >to steer the train to safety."
>
> Makes you wonder how he thinks his rocket planes work. Someone lights the
> touchpaper?

That's why his rocket planes are unworkable - because they're designed for
human pilots, rather than being 'steered' by computers (like everyone else
in the industry). This is down to Burt Rutan's 'old school' design
philosophy.

https://www.wired.com/2015/07/blame-catastrophic-blindspot-virgin-galactic-crash/

(That's Virgin Galactic. Virgin Orbit has conventional rockets, albeit
air-launched, not rocket planes)

Theo

On 08/03/2023 16:31, Recliner wrote:
> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>> In message <qm3h0ipcplb7pt5h8jqpkudmt6oakmsc4p@4ax.com>, at 13:35:09 on
>> Wed, 8 Mar 2023, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>>> On Wed, 8 Mar 2023 12:38:50 +0000, Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Nor did I that deny there might be a reduction in the force of the
>>>> collision (although the aftermath could have been worse in a less
>>>> favorable location).
>>>
>>> Are you still interested in being notified of your gradual switch to US
>>> spelling?
>>
>> No.
>>
>> Like I said last time you tried to start one of your pointless arguments
>> about this, there's so many postings to reply to (you being one of the
>> worst offenders) I don't time to correct my spell-checker back to
>> UK-English as thoroughly.
>>
>> But if course, you knew what I meant, even if seeing US spelling.
>
> Of course I knew what you meant. But you had denied that your posts
> (whoever types them) increasingly used US spelling, and asked me to prove
> it. Now I have, you say you didn't want to know.
>
> And we know you use an ancient, long-unsupported, locally-written news
> reader. Surely it came with a UK spell checker, if it has one at all?

I don't think America had been invented then.

In message <_L2OL.1674552$uA%d.684165@fx09.ams1>, at 16:31:54 on Wed, 8
Mar 2023, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>> In message <qm3h0ipcplb7pt5h8jqpkudmt6oakmsc4p@4ax.com>, at 13:35:09 on
>> Wed, 8 Mar 2023, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>>> On Wed, 8 Mar 2023 12:38:50 +0000, Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Nor did I that deny there might be a reduction in the force of the
>>>> collision (although the aftermath could have been worse in a less
>>>> favorable location).
>>>
>>> Are you still interested in being notified of your gradual switch to US
>>> spelling?
>>
>> No.
>>
>> Like I said last time you tried to start one of your pointless arguments
>> about this, there's so many postings to reply to (you being one of the
>> worst offenders) I don't time to correct my spell-checker back to
>> UK-English as thoroughly.
>>
>> But if course, you knew what I meant, even if seeing US spelling.
>
>Of course I knew what you meant. But you had denied that your posts
>(whoever types them) increasingly used US spelling,

No I haven't. I've specifically given a reason why. Partly due to the
blizzard of postings you subject the group to.

>and asked me to prove it. Now I have, you say you didn't want to know.

Oh, so it *is* your intention really is to have a pointless argument.
Glad we got that sorted out.

>And we know you use an ancient, long-unsupported, locally-written news
>reader.

It's unsupported, because it doesn't much support. But the author is a
friend of mine and we discussed maybe some possible support when we met
last December.

>Surely it came with a UK spell checker, if it has one at all?

If it doesn't have a spell-checker, how on earth would it make sense
that I agree it's changing some spellings to US-English? Do get a grip!

The spell-checker is locally written and has several good features like
the ability to add one's own words, but the basic *dictionary* (to which
several additions have been made such as English place-names) is by an
American Company. It also has dictionaries for French, Dutch, German,
Italian and Spanish, because localisation (ha! it wants to put a "z" in
there) was regarded as very important.
--
Roland Perry